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The Russian military has blamed the political leadership for its humiliating defeat 
in the Chechen war of 1994-96. Then, as the military tightened the noose around 
the neck of the Chechen resistance, the politicians decided to negotiate. This 
happened twice, once in the Summer of 1995 and again in the Summer of 1996. 
On both occasions the military had squeezed the Chechen resistance into the 
mountains, where they were holding only a handful of villages. The Chechens 
responded by staging dramatic raids; in 1995 Shamil Basaev seized a hospital in 
Budennovsk and in 1996 Aslan Maskhadov's men overwhelmed the Russian 
positions in Dzhokar (previously Grozny). This suggests that the Chechen 
fighters are well aware of the psychological power of guerrilla tactics and know 
exactly how to utilize them. Will things be different this time? Will the military 
continue to have a free hand even as international criticism, Chechen resistance, 
and Russian casualties begin to mount?  
 
Decision-making in the Kremlin remains obscure and it is not known precisely 
when, how and for what reason the Russian authorities decided they would 
pursue an all-out war against the Maskhadov government. However, since mid-
September, when a set of military measures was adopted by President Boris 
Yel'tsin, the Kremlin has eschewed a negotiated or political solution, and, to use 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's phrase, sought to fight "to the end, until complete 
victory." (Boston Globe, 3 Nov 99) This goal may become increasingly 
unattainable as the operation will face a whole spectrum of factors ranging from 
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inclement weather and tough terrain to eroding domestic support and a rising 
crescendo of international criticism.  
 
As of this writing, Russian forces are poised on Dzhokar's doorstep. Troops have 
positioned themselves in elevated spots surrounding the city, bombarding the 
capital with artillery and aircraft. That eventually they will try to take the city, 
despite having promised not to wage a full-scale war earlier in the campaign, 
seems a foregone conclusion. As little as a week after the introduction of troops 
into Chechnya, Russian leaders were still unclear as to what their next move 
would be. Would they stop with establishment of the security cordon or penetrate 
deeper to suppress finally Chechen resistance? (Agence-France Presse, 9 Oct 
99) How did the Russian military find itself in this position for a second time in 
five years? And what challenges will it face next?  
 
Russian objectives 
From the beginning, Russia's publicly held objectives have been inconsistent with 
the policies used to pursue them. If the operation was meant to arrest terrorists, 
why was it necessary to take on Maskhadov and to establish a puppet 
government in the north? Clearly, Russia has expanded beyond the original 
objectives in recent weeks with the advance of its ground forces, first into 
northern Chechnya and then into the central/southern region. In addition to the 
avowed objectives, there must be other less overt objectives that, although 
unspoken, are increasingly driving military strategy. Some of these were 
discussed in the previous Behind the Breaking News briefing (6 Oct 99) and 
include Russian ambitions in the republics south of the Caucasus, Kremlin 
intrigues, desire for revenge, ethnic hatred and military credibility.  
 
The first operational objective was to establish a security cordon around 
Chechnya to contain the Chechen "terrorists" and prevent their penetration into 
neighboring territories: Stavropol Krai, Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and 
Georgia. This aim is joined to a second, more ominous, objective -- to destroy the 
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"terrorists" and their means of operation. (ITAR-TASS, 15 and 21 Oct 99; via 
World News Connection) The open-ended nature of this second objective and 
the broad definition used by Moscow in identifying "terrorists" has allowed the 
Russian leadership to conduct a "no-bounds" military operation. Apparently, the 
Russians define "terrorists" and their base of operations as including the entire 
republic of Chechnya: its people, territory, and government. In characterizing 
military operations as a fight against terrorism, Russian leaders are counting, at a 
minimum, on the passive acquiescence of the international community.  
 
Underlying these publicly stated objectives are other, more subtle but no less real, 
objectives. These include: Russia's -- specifically the Russian military's -- need to 
regain credibility after its ignominious performance in the last war; the Russian 
need to reestablish a firm hand on wavering North Caucasus territories as well as 
to cower Azerbaijan and Georgia; and finally, the need to put a positive spin on 
Prime Minister Putin's leadership in view of upcoming Russian presidential 
elections. Currently there is strong Russian public support for military operations 
in Chechnya based on the allegations that recent apartment bombings in Russia 
where conducted by Chechen terrorists. This support will continue provided the 
war does not go on for too long and the public perceives Russian casualty figures 
as low.  
 
Military operations 
The Russian objectives have been translated into a two-phase military strategy to 
encircle and then destroy the Chechens. Since the beginning of October, 
Russian forces, under Phase One, have formed a barrier around Chechnya using 
troops from the defense and interior ministries and border guards from the 
Federal Border Guard Service. Defense and interior troops are aligned along 
Chechnya's borders with Ingushetia and Dagestan (west and east); in addition, 
defense forces entered Chechnya's northern territory, establishing a cordon 
along the Terek River and taking control of the northern third of Chechnya. 




Although Russian forces initially allowed civilian refugees to exit the ring, 
primarily into neighboring Ingushetia, the established exit corridors were closed 
for a period with the initiation of Phase Two of military operations, namely, the 
destruction of Chechen "terrorists." A single security point was opened again on 
31 October-1 November to allow civilians to leave Chechnya, but the going is 
slow with border guard and defense forces closely scrutinizing refugee papers. 
By some accounts the refugees are being charged a fee to leave. Only 100-200 
refugees, out of several thousand, reportedly were allowed to cross the border at 
the security checkpoint on 1 November. On 3 November, the "window" was 
opened more widely for a brief time. This practice is reminiscent of actions taken 
by Russia during the 1994-96 war. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 26 Oct 99)  
 
Within the cordon since the end of September, Russian fighter and bomber 
aircraft have conducted an aggressive air campaign which, Russian military 
leaders state openly, is patterned after the NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia. 
This reference to NATO places European and US leaders in an awkward position 
in criticizing Russian actions. Of course, the Russians play both sides of the 
argument. In his recent talk at Harvard University, Col Gen Valeri Manilov, first 
deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, condemned the air campaign over 
Yugoslavia based on its failed results but then admitted Russian strategists were 
mimicking the strategy for its effectiveness. When asked if the same failures he 
attributes to the NATO campaign will befall the Chechen campaign, the answer 
was, "no -- different place, different situation."  
 
By Russian accounts, targets for the Phase One air/artillery campaign were 
primarily "terrorist" camps, logistic depots and routes, command and control 
infrastructure, and sources of "terrorist" financing. Dzhokar as well as numerous 
cities and villages throughout Chechnya were bombed heavily, with large civilian 
causalities reported.  
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Ground operations under Phase One have been primarily carried out by 
elements of the 58th Army motorized rifle and infantry brigades supported by 
other deployed defense and interior ministry units. Numbers reportedly have 
increased from an initial estimated 60,000 at the beginning of October to over 
100,000. (Interfax, 22 Oct 99) It is unknown whether this number includes interior 
troops, or perhaps, Stavropol Krai Cossacks, local militias, and Dagestani 
irregulars. Additionally, Moscow has exceeded the quotas for heavy military 
equipment it may deploy in the North Caucasus under the revised Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty, which is to be signed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul 
on 18-19 November (and which already raised the total permitted on Russia's 
"Southern Flank"). (US Department of State Press Briefing Number 128, 8 Oct 
99; via www.state.gov)  
 
Chechen forces are made up of a loose alliance between the troops under 
Chechen President Maskhadov, and those under independent field commanders 
Basaev and Khattab. Their numbers are a mere estimate, and vary depending on 
who is counting. Russian estimates are between 20,000 to 40,000. The 
Chechens are much more lightly equipped with primarily small arms and some 
antitank and antiaircraft systems. Antiaircraft systems are reported to include 
some Stinger missiles received from Taliban supporters. (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 
Oct 99)  
 
Beginning the first of October, Russian forces moved into northern Chechnya 
largely unopposed. Chechen forces withdrew to the more mountainous 
central/southern region, wisely avoiding major conflicts with heavy Russian armor 
as it moved across the favorable flat and open terrain. Russian forces halted at 
the northern bank of the Terek River, effectively forming the northern segment of 
the Russian cordon and closing the ring. Russian leaders have been quick to 
"normalize" their occupation of northern Chechnya, stating they intend to 
establish a new government under military command. In the absence of credible 
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civilian administration, the military will set up local authorities to manage 
humanitarian aid, establish social services, restore power and water, and pay 
pensioners and salaries! However, civilians in northern Chechnya report they 
have yet to see Russian promises fulfilled and go further to recount stories of 
harsh, brutal treatment at the hands of the Russians. (Le Monde, 17 Oct 99)  
 
In the middle of October, Russian forces entered into Phase Two of military 
operations. The primary objective of this phase, as initially stated by Russian 
leaders, was the destruction of "terrorist" forces. However, as of the first of 
November, Russian leaders are clearly pulling off the gloves, talking increasingly 
of taking the whole of Chechnya with whatever force and time were required, 
thereby eliminating Chechen resistance. Defense Minister Igor Sergeev stated on 
28 October that "we have come here to stay for good." (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 
Oct 99)  
 
Russian ground forces have moved in from the north, east and west to the ridges 
overlooking Dzhokar and appear to be preparing a full assault on the capital, if 
necessary. Advancing Russian forces are forming a second interior security zone 
around Dzhokar, cutting off the evacuation of civilians and militants from the city. 
(ITAR-TASS, 21 Oct 99; via World News Connection) They had expected to 
complete the cordon around the capital by the end of October. Similar ground 
attacks are occurring around Gudermes (Chechnya's second largest city), Bamut 
and other key towns and cities deemed critical by Russian military planners.  
 
Effectiveness of military forces 
To date Russian forces have clearly succeeded in meeting their first stated 
objective to establish a security cordon around Chechnya. Early indications were 
that this cordon was well-defended and tightly maintained. Within the last week 
Russian security forces replaced Ingush border guards on the Ingush-Chechen 
border and federal border troops have stepped up security measures on the 
Chechen-Georgian border. Russian forces have secured the northern third of 
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Chechnya and have advanced since 15 October to the outskirts of Dzhokar. 
They retain absolute air supremacy, having destroyed the Chechen air force's 
one biplane. However, this air supremacy has not come without some cost. The 
Russians have lost at least four aircraft (Su-25 fighters and Su-24 light bombers) 
since the beginning of the conflict. These losses resulted from Chechen 
antiaircraft fire. The downed planes constitute an insignificant proportion of 
Russia's air force but may have impact on the morale of Russian pilots.  
 
With the initiation of Phase Two operations, Russian forces have entered into a 
much more difficult and risky period, which has the potential of repeating the 
mistakes of the 1994-96 war. Russian forces must go after the Chechens in the 
mountains, an environment more suited to guerrilla warfare, at the beginning of 
what promises to be a difficult winter. The Chechens are said to maintain heavy 
defense fortifications within Dzhokar and state they are ready to make their stand. 
However, it is questionable whether they will be able to make a stand in Dzhokar, 
considering the heavy bombardment of the city. Despite the obvious qualitative 
advantages, the Russians must not underestimate the Chechens, who are on 
their home territory, fighting a battle they have successfully fought before. They 
are more combat-hardened and better-equipped then they were. They will not 
surrender; they will have to be destroyed. There is little chance of breaking 
Chechen resolve. The Chechen resistance survived the 1995 death of Dzhokar 
Dudaev. If someone of Basaev's stature were captured, the others probably 
would continue the fight. The recent announcement of a $1 million bounty on 
Basaev's head (Interfax, 25 Oct 99; via nexis) testifies to Russia's own low 
estimation of its ability to catch him and the high estimation of how much damage 
his capture would inflict on the resistance.  
 
Two crucial factors favor the Chechens: the physical environment and time. As 
the Russians move into the mountainous terrain with their heavy armor, they can 
be expected to become bogged down. The Chechens will force them into 
assuming more "search and destroy" tactics, and, if the Russians move into the 
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cities, street-by-street fighting. The longer the Chechens can hold out and the 
war goes on, and the higher Russian and civilian casualty numbers climb, the 
more likely it is that Russian public support will erode and international criticism 
will increase. As this happens Russia political leadership will have to re-establish 
control over what are currently almost exclusively military decisions. War is not 
just about technology and military operations; it is also about psychology and 
politics. The Chechens know how to exploit Russian fear. They will wait to strike, 
and when they do, they will do so with daring. Their actions will be planned to 
cause high Russian casualties. They will create the impression they cannot be 
defeated, as they did when they conducted raids in 1995 and 1996. They will 
continue to decry the "inhumane civilian tolls" the Russians are exacting, causing 
the international pressure to mount. Already the Chechens are reporting civilian 
casualty counts in the thousands, overwhelmingly women and children.  
 
The Russians have two options at this point. One, strike very quickly to 
accomplish their objectives before they must eventually bow to public and 
international pressure, in order to sweep through Chechnya and eliminate the 
opposition. Two, continue to maneuver slowly and methodically to contain and 
destroy Chechen resistance. Which option is more likely? The first choice would 
compel the Russians to engage in close combat, where casualties would mount 
very quickly. The second option would take too long and ultimately play into 
Chechen hands. So what is left? Will the Russian leadership negotiate now, 
while it controls the "commanding heights?" Past behavior is not encouraging.  
 
Appendix: Russian Casualty Figures  
 
How many Russian fatalities have there been so far? The following list of official 
cumulative tallies shows clearly that the Russian government is under-
representing the number of servicemen they have lost. If 243 were lost by 18 
September, how on earth could the official tally stand at 222 on 29 October?  
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18 Sep                  243    (losses during Dagestan operations) 
8 Oct                     156    (total number for ops in both Dagestan and Chechnya) 
15 Oct                   179    (total number for ops in Dagestan and Chechnya) 
20 Oct                   190    (cumulative for Chechnya only) 
21 Oct                   196    (cumulative for Chechnya only) 
26 Oct                   200+  (cumulative for Chechnya only) 
29 Oct                   222    (total number for ops in Dagestan and Chechnya) 
2 Nov                    600    (Soldiers' Mothers Committee estimate) 
 
According to the official Chechen statement of 17 October, 1,500 Russian 
servicemen have been killed in the conflict thus far.  
 
The following table represents an attempt to keep a daily tally of the official 
claims of both sides as to the number of Russian casualties. As can be readily 
seen from the table, the information is not reported in a consistent and regular 
manner. The chief source used was the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, 
via ITAR-TASS and Interfax. Specific citations are available from the author.  
 
Key: R--Russian official statement for the day   C--Chechen official statement for 
the day 
                              Dead                       Wounded                          Captured 
                            R          C              R               C                                C 
7 Oct                   125        ?               400 
8 Oct                   20-30 
8 Oct                   4           200            1                                                 40 
9 Oct                   7                             37  
15 Oct                 7                             21  (Interior troops) 
17 Oct                 47           
18 Oct                 2                             1 
19 Oct                              60 
26 Oct                              81                               100 
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The Chechen side reported that a group of RF military intelligence officers was 
killed without saying how many servicemen were in the group. 
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